We document the first systematic evidence on the characteristics and economic consequences of firms subject to employee allegations of corporate financial misdeeds. First, compared to a control group that avoided public whistle-blowing allegations, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were characterized by unique firmspecific factors that led employees to expose alleged financial misdeeds. Second, on average, whistle-blowing announcements were associated with a negative 2.8 percent market-adjusted five-day stock price reaction; this reaction was especially negative for allegations involving earnings management ͑Ϫ7.3 percent͒. Third, compared to a control group that exhibits similar characteristics, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were associated with further negative consequences including earnings restatements, shareholder lawsuits, and negative future operating and stock return performance. Finally, whistle-blowing targets exposed by the press were more likely to make subsequent improvements in corporate governance. Our results suggest whistleblowing is far from a trivial nuisance for targeted firms, and on average, appears to be a useful mechanism for uncovering agency issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T he purpose of our study is to identify characteristics of firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations, examine the economic consequences of such allegations, and thus shed light on the role of employee whistle-blowers in uncovering corporate financial misdeeds. Notable anecdotal evidence suggests that whistle-blowers can make a difference. For example, two whistle-blowers, Cynthia Cooper and Sherron Watkins, played significant roles in exposing accounting frauds at WorldCom and Enron, respectively, and were named as the 2002 "persons of the year" by TIME magazine. In response to Enron, WorldCom, and other scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ͑SOX͒ in July 2002, which, in part, made it unlawful for companies to take punitive action against employees who disclose "questionable accounting or auditing matters" ͑SOX Section 806, codified as title 15 U.S.C., § 78f͑m͒͑4͒͒. Under the whistle-blower provisions of SOX, employees who disclose improper financial practices receive greater protection from discrimination ͑Title 18 U.S.C., § 1514A͑a͒͑1͒͒. SOX also required firms listed on a U.S. stock exchange to set up a hotline enabling whistle-blowers to communicate anonymously to the board of directors ͑Economist 2006 ͒. Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission is considering a whistle-blower program to encourage individuals to identify potential violations of federal securities laws ͑SEC 2009͒.
In contrast to these anecdotes suggesting that whistle-blowers help uncover financial improprieties, skeptics argue that ͑1͒ whistle-blowers often misjudge the situation and indulge in trivial or frivolous complaints ͑Miceli and Near 1992͒, ͑2͒ "Machiavellian" whistle-blowers who have an axe to grind lodge baseless allegations ͑Gobert and Punch 2000͒, and ͑3͒ ineffective workers misuse their protected "whistle-blower" status to avoid discharges or disciplinary proceedings ͑Schmidt 2003͒.
Despite the recent prominence of whistle-blowing events, we are not aware of prior work in the accounting and finance literatures that attempts to resolve the conflict between these perspectives. We examine the characteristics of firms subject to publicly available whistle-blowing allegations and the economic consequences of whistle-blowing events for target firms. We analyze 81 employee whistle-blowing allegations related to financial misconduct between 1989 and 2004 reported in the financial press ͑Press sample͒ and 137 instances of employee whistle-blowing between 2002 and 2004 obtained from records of the U.S. government's Occupational Safety and Health Administration office ͑OSHA͒, the agency responsible for handling complaints of discrimination from whistle-blowers who report SOX-related allegations ͑OSHA sample͒. We label these wide-ranging allegations as "external financial" whistle-blowing events. They are "external" because they are made known outside of the organization; we generally cannot observe cases of whistle-blowing that are resolved internally. They are "financial" because they include alleged earnings management, improper disclosure, insider trading, price-fixing in product markets, tax fraud, or violations of securities regulation. We investigate four related research questions:
whistle-blowing events? Do these firms experience more earnings restatements, more shareholder lawsuits, and/or poorer future operating and stock return performance? Q4: Do firms respond to whistle-blowing allegations by improving their governance structure?
To investigate our first research question ͑Q1͒, we identify variables that potentially differentiate firms subject to public whistle-blowing actions. We argue that certain firm characteristics are associated with the probability that an employee will voice an allegation of financial impropriety to someone outside the organization. We compare whistle-blowing samples to two control groups: ͑1͒ a broad set of firms not subject to whistle-blowing allegations, and ͑2͒ firms "tarnished" by either a shareholder lawsuit or an earnings restatement ͑suggesting some level of financial misdeeds͒ that were able to avoid an external whistle-blowing allegation.
Compared to other tarnished firms, both Press and OSHA firms were more likely to be large, growing firms with strong recent stock return performance that had recently suffered employee layoffs. In addition, Press firms had relatively weak external monitoring and OSHA firms were relatively well regarded, had weak internal monitoring, and were more likely to be firms where the whistle-blowing employee had the opportunity to share in the proceeds of any fraud-related settlement with the U.S. government. Overall, we interpret our evidence as consistent with whistleblowing targets being systematically different from other tarnished firms that avoided public whistle-blowing allegations of financial wrongdoing.
Our second research question ͑Q2͒ addresses the immediate stock market reaction to whistleblowing allegations that are reported in the press. We find the average market-adjusted five-day stock return surrounding the announcement in the financial press was Ϫ2.8 percent. This reaction was especially negative if the allegation involved earnings management ͑Ϫ7.3 percent͒.
Our third research question ͑Q3͒ investigates subsequent economic consequences for firms targeted by whistle-blowing allegations, including restatements, lawsuits, and poor operating and stock return performance. Our research design uses a propensity-score matched control sample that includes firms with similar characteristics as the whistle-blowing targets to control for the fact that whistle-blowing is not an exogenous event and that negative consequences following whistleblowing allegations could arise from many of the same underlying economic forces that contribute to the allegations themselves.
Compared to a propensity-score matched control sample, we find that whistle-blowing targets identified by the press were more likely to restate their earnings and be subject to shareholder litigation in the three years following the whistle-blowing allegation. In addition, we find evidence suggesting whistle-blowing targets ͑both Press and OSHA͒ suffered lower operating and stock return performance than did their control firm counterparts. Thus, whistle-blowers appeared to expose firms that ͑1͒ engaged in financial misconduct and ͑2͒ had previously unknown agency problems-both of which resulted in negative future consequences for the firm.
1 Evidence of such negative ex post consequences is consistent with the implicit premise in SOX that whistle-blowers can disclose valuable new information about firms' agency problems.
Our fourth research question ͑Q4͒ examines firms' responses to whistle-blowing allegations. We find that, compared to a matched control sample, firms subject to public whistle-blowing allegations ͑Press sample͒ were more likely to reduce the size of the board, reduce the proportion of insiders on the board, have less busy directors, and replace their CEO, whereas firms subject to less publicized whistle-blowing allegations ͑OSHA firms͒ did not respond to these allegations by making governance changes.
Overall, our evidence suggests that whistle-blowing is an important mechanism for discovering information about agency problems at firms. On balance, our findings are inconsistent with claims by critics that whistle-blowing complaints are frivolous, misleading, or unreliable. Our research also provides indirect evidence on the efficacy of SOX Section 806 as a mechanism to uncover agency issues at firms. Interestingly, public whistle-blowing events are relatively infrequent, and a majority of the whistle-blowing allegations we identify are not directly related to the types of fraudulent behavior that precipitated the SOX legislation.
From a broader perspective, we contribute to an emerging stream of literature in corporate governance related to how information about financial wrongdoing reaches the stock market. In related work, Dyck et al. ͑2008͒ investigate who reveals information about corporate fraud. Using a sample of firms subject to shareholder class action litigation, they find that the most important sources of information are employees ͑19 percent of the cases͒, media ͑16 percent͒, and analysts ͑15 percent͒. Unlike Dyck et al. ͑2008͒, our focus is on ͑1͒ characteristics of firms targeted by employee whistle-blowers, ͑2͒ the economic consequences of whistle-blowing revelations, and ͑3͒ firms' responses via governance changes subsequent to such whistle-blowing events. In addition, Miller ͑2006͒ investigates the role of the press in revealing fraud, but does not indicate that employees are often named as the source of the articles. Furthermore, Miller ͑2006͒ identifies firms that are, ex post, known to have committed financial wrongdoing, and tracks these firms to determine the role of the press in uncovering these known cases of wrongdoing. In contrast, we identify firms alleged to have engaged in financial wrongdoing, and examine whether these firms ultimately suffered negative consequences.
Section II discusses financial whistle-blowing and introduces predictions about firm-specific factors likely to be associated with whistle-blowing events. Section III describes the sample and Section IV presents evidence on the predictions discussed in Section II. Section V presents evidence on stock price reactions surrounding whistle-blowing allegations and also provides evidence on longer-term consequences of whistle-blowing actions. Section VI reports evidence on whether firms improve governance after whistle-blowing allegations. Section VII provides a summary of findings and contributions.
II. BACKGROUND AND CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS SUBJECT TO WHISTLE-BLOWING ALLEGATIONS Financial Whistle-Blowing-Internal versus External
Miceli and Near ͑1985͒ define whistle-blowing as the disclosure by either former or current employees of alleged illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices that are under employer control. Figure 1 summarizes outcomes of potential employee whistle-blowing allegations and related consequences for the targeted firm. Whistle-blowing can be either internal or external. Internal whistle-blowing involves informing relevant members of the firm ͑e.g., management, internal audit͒ about potential wrongdoing. External whistle-blowing, on the other hand, involves either an internal allegation becoming public or the whistle-blower directly disclosing an allegation outside the organization ͑e.g., to the media or a regulatory agency such as OSHA͒. We focus on external whistle-blowing because instances of internal whistle-blowing generally are not reported in the media and public data on such cases generally are not available. Moreover, we concentrate only on whistle-blowing related to financial practices.
Congressional Action to Protect Whistle-Blowers
Largely in response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the SarbanesOxley Act ͑SOX͒ in July 2002.
2 SOX, in part, sought to provide whistle-blowers greater legal protection. In addition to creating civil remedies for retaliation against employees in fraud cases, SOX made it a felony to take any action that is harmful to any person in retaliation for providing information about a federal crime to law enforcement officials. Thus, a retaliatory firing or demotion of a whistle-blowing employee would constitute a crime.
Whistle-Blowing is Frivolous, Misused, Misleading, and/or Unreliable
Some survey evidence ͑Brickey 2003; Zingales 2004͒ suggests that the personal cost to the whistle-blower can be high.
3 Given that whistle-blowers likely anticipate these costs, their allega-2 Enron and WorldCom represent high-profile examples of internal whistle-blowing that became public. Our general conclusions are not affected when we delete Enron and WorldCom from the sample, i.e., our results are not driven by these prominent examples. 3 Zingales ͑2004͒ summarizes evidence on the consequences of whistle-blowing for individual employees. In a 1992 survey of 1,500 federal workers, 25 percent of employees reported that they experienced verbal harassment and intimidation; 20 percent were shunned by co-workers and managers; 18 percent were assigned to less desirable duties; and 11 percent were denied a promotion. A 1998 survey of 448 emergency physicians paints an even worse picture: 23 percent of those who complained about an issue reported having been fired or threatened with termination. Brickey ͑2003͒ reports that a random review of 200 whistle-blower complaints filed with the National Whistleblower Center in 2002 found that about half of the complainants said they were fired after they reported misconduct. The remaining complain-tions should be credible. However, some critics suggest that whistle-blowers often misjudge the situation and lodge frivolous complaints to garner attention and publicity ͑Near and Miceli 1996͒. Indeed, in June 2005, the French government's Data Protection Authority refused to allow the installation of anonymous whistle-blower hotlines, saying that such lines "were disproportionate to the objectives sought with the risks of slanderous denunciations" ͑Economist 2006͒. Furthermore, troublemakers could potentially misuse their whistle-blower status to avoid being suspended or dismissed from employment. For example, Anechiarico and Jacobs ͑1996͒ argue that several municipal employees in New York City chose to blow the whistle in order to fall under state protection as a pre-emptive measure to being fired. Hence, given the enormous trouble that can result from disciplining a whistle-blower, supervisors and managers might find it easier to tolerate an unproductive and ineffective employee rather than dismiss or demote the employee. Gobert and Punch ͑2000͒ argue that an employee might even be excluded from necessary salary cuts to avoid the perception that such a cut is retaliation against the whistle-blower. On average, if whistleblower complaints are frivolous, misused, misleading, and/or unreliable, then we should observe no significant economic consequences to a whistle-blowing action. Having said that, we acknowledge that even the taint of an allegation could potentially lead to some negative consequences for the firm.
Characteristics of Firms Subject to Whistle-Blowing Allegations: Opportunities and Incentives for Committing Financial Misdeeds
In this section, we argue that whistle-blowing allegations are related to management's opportunity and incentives to engage in financial wrongdoing and are a function of employees' incentives to voice their allegations outside the organization. At the outset, we acknowledge that some of these hypothesized factors are exploratory and descriptive. Given how little published research exists in the area of whistle-blowing, a solid theory is not available on why whistle-blowing occurs and what its consequences may be. Hence, we believe our descriptive approach is appropriate at this early stage of the literature's development. Factors we expect to explain external whistleblowing follow.
Capital Market Pressure
In recent years, firms have faced heightened capital market pressure to deliver sustained earnings growth ͑Graham et al. 2005͒. Such pressures have likely created incentives for some managers to aggressively boost earnings, either via earnings management or via other questionable practices such as overbilling customers or improper disclosure of material financial events. We predict that firms subject to capital market pressure are more likely to experience a whistleblowing event. To capture capital market pressure, we rely on three variables ͑described in detail in the Appendix͒ to proxy for ͑1͒ the need to access capital ͑FIN_NEED͒, ͑2͒ merger and acquisition activity ͑M&A͒, and ͑3͒ the amount of potential earnings management ͑ABSDACC͒. We compute the averaged scaled rank of these three proxies and label the averaged rank as CM_PRESSURE.
Growth
Firms that are rapidly growing are more likely to outgrow their controls. Responsibility for overall decision-making is typically spread across many individuals, and as a firm grows and responsibility is spread over more individuals, each individual has less information and authority ants had been subjected to other retaliatory action such as on-the-job harassment or discipline. A survey by another watchdog group, the Government Accountability Project, found that about 90 percent of whistle-blowers are subjected to reprisals or threats.
to stop wrongdoing ͑Baucus and Near 1991͒. We predict that growth firms are more likely to be subject to a whistle-blowing event. We proxy for high-growth environments by using the scaled rank of sales growth ͑GROWTH͒ over the three years prior to the whistle-blowing event.
Past Performance
We predict that firms with strong past stock market performance are more likely to be a target of whistle-blowing for two reasons. First, these firms are more newsworthy to the media. Second, an employee might be more likely to expose financial misdeeds perceived to enable the firm to artificially achieve strong performance. We measure the prior performance of the firm ͑PAST_PERF͒ as the scaled rank of stock returns over the year before the whistle-blowing event.
Firm Reputation
We predict that a highly regarded firm is more likely to attract the ire of a disgruntled employee and the resulting allegation is more likely to be newsworthy. The external whistleblower or the media outlet is likely to get more attention from exposing wrongdoing at a highly regarded firm. 4 We proxy for firm reputation based on whether the firm is listed either as a "Most Admired" firm or a "Best Place to Work For" by Fortune magazine ͑REPUTATION͒ in any of the five years prior to the whistle-blowing event.
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Unclear Internal Communication Channels
We hypothesize that the employee's motivation to resort to external whistle-blowing is higher when channels for raising concerns within the company are unclear. This situation likely occurs in at least two cases. First, Rothschild and Miethe ͑1999͒ suggest that bureaucratic and undemocratic work environments are likely to experience higher levels of external whistle-blowing because of significant barriers to effective internal whistle-blowing. Miceli and Near ͑1994͒ state that it is common for employees to first report problematic activities to management and, if the issue is ignored, then resort to reporting the problem to external audiences such as the media. We assume older firms ͑AGE͒ are likely to be more bureaucratic and, hence, more likely to be subject to a whistle-blowing action.
Second, King ͑1999͒ argues that geographical distance and multiple industrial segments in a firm make communication channels less clear. In particular, an employee who has to report a misdeed to a boss he or she hardly knows and who is geographically distant might feel uncomfortable raising sensitive issues ͑Miceli and Near 1994; Beresford et al. 2003͒ . Such unclear internal communication channels increase the likelihood the employee will resort to external whistle-blowing. We measure industrial and geographical concentration as the HerfindahlHirschman index in the year prior to the whistle-blowing event based on revenues for each of the firm's industrial and geographic segments, respectively ͑IND_CONC and GEO_CONC͒. We expect the probability of external whistle-blowing to decrease with the industrial and geographic concentration of the firm's business segments. Our empirical measure for unclear communication channels ͑COMMUNICATION͒ is the averaged scaled rank of AGE, IND_CONC, and GEO-_CONC.
Employee Downsizing
Luthans and Sommer ͑1999͒ find that following employee downsizing, employees experience a decline in both loyalty and commitment to the firm. We predict that employees, especially former employees who have been let go, are more likely to make public allegations following layoffs. Further, layoffs can increase the level of animosity between the firm and existing employees, and if existing employees perceive their job as being less secure, the potential cost of blowing the whistle decreases. We proxy for downsizing ͑DOWNSIZE͒ by using the scaled rank of the average percentage change in the number of employees over the three years prior to the whistleblowing event.
Monetary Incentive to Report Financial Misdeeds (Qui Tam)
In certain instances, whistle-blowers have the potential to benefit financially by uncovering corporate misdeeds. Under the Federal False Claims Act, citizens who help uncover fraud in government contracts or government programs may be awarded a portion of the recovered funds. Since these whistle-blower provisions went into effect in 1986, the government has recovered over $15.6 billion in settlements and judgments from these qui tam-related cases. Of this amount, over 16 percent of the recovered funds have been distributed to the individuals who helped bring the fraud to light ͑TAF 2009͒.
The majority of qui tam cases fall into one of two industries: healthcare and defense contracting. Over 70 percent of the funds recovered as part of the qui tam provisions relate to matters in which the Department of Health and Human Services is the primary agency, while over 15 percent of the recovered funds pertain to matters in which the Department of Defense is the primary agency. We argue that the qui tam provisions included in the Federal False Claims Act provide employees in the healthcare and defense industries with increased incentives to blow the whistle. We proxy for these qui tam incentives and set QUITAM equal to 1 if the firm is in a healthcare industry ͑two-digit SIC code equal to 80͒ or if the firm has been on the Department of Defense's "100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards" list in any of the three years prior to the whistle-blowing event.
Firm Size
The media is generally more interested in information about firms that are large ͑Miller 2006͒. It is also possible that regulators ͑e.g., OSHA͒ are similarly more likely to pay attention to information about large firms. As a result, employees of large firms are likely to be more confident that their allegations will have an audience, and we therefore predict that employees of large firms will be more likely to make allegations of financial wrongdoing. Our proxy for firm size ͑SIZE͒ is the scaled rank of sales in the year prior to the whistle-blowing event.
Internal Control Weaknesses
Internal controls weaknesses are defined as "a significant likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected" ͑PCAOB 2004͒. We argue that employees are more likely to resort to external whistle-blowing when the firm has poor internal controls. To capture the extent of a firm's internal control weaknesses ͑ICW͒, we use the scaled rank of the fitted value from a model of the determinants of internal control weaknesses, as outlined by Doyle et al. ͑2007͒ and described in the Appendix.
External Monitoring
Managers are more likely to engage in financial misconduct when the quality of external monitoring is poor. To capture such external monitoring we use two empirical proxies: ͑1͒ the presence of block-holders ͑BLOCK͒ and ͑2͒ public pension funds ownership ͑PP͒. Consistent with prior literature ͑e.g., Cremers et al. 2005͒, we argue that firms for which BLOCK and PP are low are characterized by relatively poor external monitoring. We use the averaged scaled rank of BLOCK and PP measured in the year prior to the whistle-blowing event and label the averaged rank EXT_MONITOR. We expect a negative association between whistle-blowing allegations and monitoring by powerful shareholders.
Governance
Managers are more likely to indulge in wrongdoing in the presence of weak corporate governance and strong private incentives. To capture the quality of internal governance, we obtain board data from the IRRC database, and use the averaged scaled rank of seven empirical proxies ͑described in detail in the Appendix͒ related to ͑1͒ the CEO's private incentives and ͑2͒ overall board structure. We label the averaged rank as GOVERNANCE.
Model for Assessing Characteristics of Firms Subject to Whistle-Blowing Allegations
Next, we estimate a logistic model and regress the presence or absence of a whistle-blowing allegation on the above-mentioned proxies. We introduce industry fixed effects ͑based on two-digit SIC codes other than for SIC code 80 covered by QUITAM͒ and year fixed effects as controls for potential unspecified factors. Model 1 ͑where firm and year subscripts are suppressed͒ links whistle-blowing events to managerial incentives to commit financial misdeeds and the whistleblowers' likelihood of coming forward:
where Pr͑Whistle-blowing͒ is the probability of a whistle-blowing event for this binary dependent variable, i.e., 1 ϭ a whistle-blowing event and 0 ϭ none. Detailed definitions for the independent variables are in the Appendix.
III. WHISTLE-BLOWING SAMPLES AND CONTROL FIRMS Whistle-Blowing Samples
Our whistle-blower sample comes from two sources, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The first source, labeled the Press sample, consists of 81 whistle-blowing events drawn from a Lexis-Nexis search of every combination of the following two groups of search terms ͑1͒ "whistle," "whistleblowing," "whistleblower," "whistle-blower," and ͑2͒ "financial," "accounting," "reporting," "fraud," "accounting fraud" over the calendar years 1989 to 2004. Note that the Press sample label does not imply that employee whistle-blowers directly informed the press. These are merely instances of whistle-blowing reported in the media.
The second source, labeled the OSHA sample, consists of 137 whistle-blowing discrimination cases gathered from written requests to the Occupational Health and Safety Administration ͑OSHA͒.
6 While OSHA handles other varieties of whistle-blower allegations besides those who 6 While the vast majority of OSHA cases were not resolved in favor of the employee whistle-blower ͑Moberly 2007; New York Times 2009͒, this does not negate the importance or credibility of the allegations. First, OSHA's rulings were decisions about whether the whistle-blower was discriminated against-not rulings on whether the alleged financial impropriety was taking place. It is entirely possible that the underlying allegation of impropriety was credible and important, even though OSHA determined the employee was not treated unfairly. Second, Moberly ͑2007͒ finds that one of the reasons employee whistle-blowers have not been successful at winning claims is because "OSHA tended to misapply Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof regarding causation, to the substantial detriment of employees." Thus, despite the limited success employee whistle-blowers have had in their discrimination cases filed with OSHA, it remains unclear whether these employees were raising concerns about legitimate cases of financial malfeasance, e.g., a New York Times ͑2009͒ editorial argues that "Most often, the reason for the dismissal has nothing to do with the merits of the claim to have uncovered fraud and file for protection under SOX, we asked for and received data related only to financial whistle-blowing under the purview of SOX. 7 These cases represent whistle-blowers' complaints of discrimination in the workplace ͑e.g., demotion, termination͒ for having voiced allegations of financial impropriety. In essence, the OSHA sample reflects the very whistle-blowers SOX Section 806 was intending to protect. While we are unable to observe whistle-blowing allegations that did not result in alleged employee discrimination ͑because these allegations were not reported to OSHA͒ and did not otherwise become public, each OSHA case represents a previously internal allegation of financial wrongdoing being made public. Figure 1 highlights the external whistle-blowing allegations we are able to observe.
The Press sample differs from the OSHA sample in several ways. First, the Press sample likely reflects the media's bias in covering more visible, important, or sensational whistle-blowing allegations. In contrast, the OSHA sample is likely to be less biased but is more likely to include relatively frivolous complaints. Second, Callahan and Dworkin ͑1994͒ find that misdeeds reported to the media are likely to involve larger sums of money than those reported to other outlets. Third, observations in the Press sample, by definition, represent a clear public revelation of the whistleblowing allegation whereas the OSHA whistle-blowing data are less likely to be widely disseminated in local and national media given the information has to be obtained via a special request from a government agency. Fourth, we can ascertain the date on which the whistle-blowing allegation was made public based on the news story in the press; such event-dating is difficult with the OSHA sample. Hence, we conduct a study of the stock market reaction surrounding the whistle-blowing event only for the Press sample. However, to the extent possible, we examine the long-run consequences of both types of whistle-blowing events.
We start with an initial Press ͑OSHA͒ sample of 81 ͑137͒ unique firms. Table 1 lists the nature of whistle-blowing allegations in both samples. These diverse allegations range from clearly "earnings management" to potential earnings management ͑e.g., "overbilling" with the motivation to boost revenue͒ to other accounting decisions that affect disclosure ͑e.g., "improper disclosure" and "accounting irregularities"͒ to other types of financial impropriety not directly related to financial reporting ͑e.g., "insider trading," "price-fixing" and "tax fraud"͒.
Control Samples
We rely on two control samples. The purpose of the first control sample ͑labeled "broad control sample"͒ is to benchmark our whistle-blowing firms against a broad set of firms that have not been publicly accused of financial improprieties by employee whistle-blowers. This sample consists of all firms that have non-missing CRSP and Compustat data for all of the independent variables listed in model ͑1͒. All observations that have non-missing data in the year before the whistle-blowing event for one of our sample firms are eligible for inclusion in the broad control case." Our study provides direct evidence on this question. 7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act did not assign the job of protecting whistle-blowers to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Instead, the task went to the Labor Department's OSHA because the law's drafters reasoned that OSHA had a record of helping workers penalized for voicing concerns. For example, OSHA has the responsibility of enforcing 13 additional whistle-blower statutes covering truckers, airline mechanics, nuclear-power-plant employees, and others. 8 The number of firms used in each empirical test is reported in the tables that follow and varies depending on data availability.
sample at the first pass. We next impose the following filters: ͑1͒ no observation relating to any of the sample firms can be included in the broad control sample, and ͑2͒ no control firm can appear in the broad control sample more than once ͑i.e., no more than one firm-year observation for each control firm͒. Whenever we found multiple observations from the same firm in the control sample, we randomly selected just one firm-year. One drawback to benchmarking the whistle-blowing sample to a broad sample of firms is that firms subject to a whistle-blowing event are inherently different from the average firm. Thus, we construct a second control group by comparing whistle-blowing firms to other firms tarnished by allegations of financial misdeeds that have not been exposed to a public whistle-blowing event. In particular, we identify firms that were subject to a lawsuit during the years 1989-2006 ͑"lawsuit sample"͒ and firms that filed earnings restatements between 1997-2005 based on two GAO reports ͑"restatement sample"͒. We emphasize comparisons between our whistle-blowing samples and this second control group because they allow us to more directly assess differences between firms that face whistle-blowing allegations and other tarnished firms that avoid public allegations.
We rely on an updated version of the lawsuit sample of 1,119 usable firms compiled by DuCharme et al. 
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF FIRMS FACING EXTERNAL WHISTLE-BLOWING ALLEGATIONS (Q1)
In this section, we present evidence on the characteristics of the whistle-blowing targets versus the two control samples discussed in Section III. Given the Press and OSHA samples differ, we separately compare each whistle-blowing sample to the control samples.
Whistle-Blowing Firms versus the Broad Control Sample
In Panel A of Table 2 , we compare whistle-blowing firms to the broad control sample of firms that have avoided external whistle-blowing allegations. We estimate multivariate model ͑1͒ separately for the Press sample in columns 1 and 2 and the OSHA sample in columns 3 and 4. Columns 1 and 3 present results without the external monitoring and internal governance variables because data restrictions on these variables severely restrict our sample sizes. Results in columns 2 and 4 include external monitoring and internal governance variables.
We find that, relative to the broad control sample, whistle-blowing firms in both Press and OSHA samples ͑1͒ were growing more rapidly ͑with statistically significant differences reported in columns 1, 2, and 3͒, ͑2͒ had relatively unclear internal communication channels ͑all four columns͒, ͑3͒ came from QUITAM environments where the whistle-blower had an opportunity to share in the proceeds of any fraud-related settlement with the U.S. Government ͑columns 1, 3, and 4͒, and ͑4͒ were larger ͑all four columns͒. Results in columns 2 and 4 suggest that whistle-blowing targets also had relatively weak external monitoring. We also find some evidence that capital market pressures were associated with whistle-blowing ͑columns 2 and 3͒. Two variables were only significant for the OSHA sample. OSHA firms were more likely to ͑1͒ have a strong reputation ͑columns 3 and 4͒, and ͑2͒ have undergone employee downsizing ͑column 3͒.
Whistle-Blowing Firms versus Lawsuit and Restatement Firms
In Panel B of Table 2 , we compare the whistle-blowing sample to a combined sample composed of the lawsuit and restatement control samples.
10 Although both whistle-blowing firms and these control firms ͑lawsuit and restatement firms͒ are likely tarnished, only the whistle-blowing targets experienced a public allegation. Hence, our analysis in Panel B focuses on differences between firms where employees made external whistle-blowing allegations and lawsuit and restatement firms where a public whistle-blowing allegation presumably could have been made.
Compared to lawsuit and restatement firms, whistle-blowing firms ͑1͒ were growing more rapidly ͑significant in all four columns of Panel B͒, ͑2͒ were relatively more successful in their prior stock return performance ͑all four columns͒, ͑3͒ had experienced employee downsizing ͑columns 2, 3, and 4͒, and ͑4͒ were larger ͑all four columns͒.
11 In addition, OSHA firms ͑1͒ were more highly regarded ͑columns 3 and 4͒, ͑2͒ came from QUITAM environments ͑columns 3 and 9 We eliminate firms that overlap the whistle-blowing treatment sample and the tarnished-firm control sample ͑lawsuits and restatements͒ to avoid any mechanical correlation between these samples. 10 In an effort to capture the period of alleged financial malfeasance for our control firms, for lawsuit firms we calculate the average of all our continuous variables over the years of alleged wrongdoing. For restatement firms we calculate the average of all our continuous variables over the three years prior to the restatement announcement ͑t−1 through t−3͒.
For comparability, we also use prior three-year averages for the continuous variables in our whistle-blowing sample. 11 We acknowledge that the finding that whistle-blowing firms are characterized by relatively more successful prior stock return performance may be driven by the fact that lawsuits are often triggered by poor stock performance. *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
p-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions. We report ͑1 Ϫ p͒ values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. Firm and year subscripts are suppressed.
4͒, and ͑3͒ had relatively weak external monitoring ͑column 4͒. Press firms appeared to have worse governance ͑column 2͒. In general, a comparison of whistle-blowing firms to lawsuit and restatement firms suggests whistle-blowing firms were systematically different from other tarnished firms. These unique environmental factors encouraged whistle-blowers to make their allegations public and help explain why some firms were subject to whistle-blowing allegations while other firms that presumably could have been targeted by whistle-blowers did not experience such allegations.
V. IMMEDIATE (Q2) AND SUBSEQUENT (Q3) CONSEQUENCES OF WHISTLE-BLOWING ALLEGATIONS Immediate Stock Market Reactions to Whistle-Blowing Announcements
Recall that we can compute stock market reactions only for the Press sample, as the dates on which the OSHA whistle-blowing events become public are not generally available. Panel A of Table 3 presents evidence on the stock market reaction to whistle-blowing events measured around five days, from the day before the announcement to three days after ͑day Ϫ1 through day ϩ3͒. RET represents raw returns while CAR signifies market-adjusted returns. The mean five-day abnormal market-adjusted stock market reaction was Ϫ2.84 percent. The median abnormal reactions, while smaller in magnitude, were also significantly negative. Given that the median market capitalization of a Press sample firm was $7.3 billion ͑untabulated͒, market reactions following whistle-blowing allegations resulted in significant losses in shareholder value, on average. The frequency of negative reactions is also high, at 67.9 percent of the sample.
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These significant negative reactions suggest that, on average, announcements of whistleblowing allegations were economically important for the targeted firm and were not immediately seen as frivolous by stock market participants. We consider subsequent economic consequences of these whistle-blowing allegations later in Section V.
Cross-Sectional Determinants of the Stock Market Reactions to Whistle-Blowing Announcements
In Panel B of Table 3 , we attempt to explain the cross-sectional distribution of stock market reactions to a whistle-blowing event by including five factors that potentially affect investors' reaction to whistle-blowing allegations. First, we expect larger firms ͑SIZE͒ to suffer larger negative stock price reactions. Larger firms have deeper pockets and are more likely to be the subject of a subsequent class action lawsuit. Second, highly regarded firms have more credibility to lose from an external whistle-blowing action reported in the financial press. We measure a firm's reputation based on whether the firm is ranked as most admired or best to work for per Fortune magazine ͑REPUTATION͒. Third, awareness of whistle-blowing actions likely heightened after the passage of SOX, and we expect the stock market to react more negatively to a whistle-blowing action in the post-SOX era. We define a variable, SOX, set equal to 1 if the whistle-blowing action was reported in the press after the calendar year 2002. Fourth, we argue that allegations of earnings management and overbilling represent especially large agency issues, and we predict these allegations are likely to result in particularly negative stock market reactions. EM is set to 1 if the allegation pertains to earnings management ͑and 0 otherwise͒ and OVERBILLING is set to 1 if the allegation involves overbilling ͑and 0 otherwise͒.
Panel B of Table 3 presents evidence on the cross-sectional variation in stock price reactions around whistle-blowing allegations. Two of our predictions are consistently significant. We find that the stock market viewed whistle-blowing allegations relatively negatively for firms with alleged earnings management. Specifically, the coefficient on EM is Ϫ0.143 ͑t-statistic ϭ Ϫ3.04͒ indicating that allegations related to earnings management resulted in an average incremental ͑overall͒ Ϫ14.3 percent ͑Ϫ7.3 percent͒ return over the five-day window. Allegations of overbilling indicate an average incremental ͑overall͒ Ϫ7.4 percent ͑Ϫ0.4 percent͒ five-day return. Hence, it appears that, on average, whistle-blowing events were far from trivial for targeted firms, particularly for firms accused of managing earnings.
Subsequent Consequences of Whistle-Blowing Events (Q3)
In this section, we explore four potential subsequent consequences of whistle-blowing events: ͑a͒ earnings restatements, ͑b͒ shareholder lawsuits, ͑c͒ future operating performance, and ͑d͒ future stock market performance. If a whistle-blowing event reveals financial reporting or agency *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
p-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions. We report ͑1 Ϫ p͒ values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted. a p-values are one-sided associated with t-statistics. b p-values are one-sided associated with Wilcoxon Z-statistics.
Variable Definitions ͑where firm and year subscripts are suppressed͒: RET ϭ five-day cumulative raw returns beginning the day before the whistle-blowing allegation; CAR ϭ five-day cumulative abnormal returns beginning the day before the whistle-blowing allegation; SIZE ϭ total sales revenue for the year before the whistle-blowing event; REPUTATION ϭ an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm has appeared on Fortune's "Best Companies to Work For" list or on Fortune's "Most Admired Companies" list in any of the five years prior to the whistle-blowing event, and coded as 0 otherwise; SOX ϭ an indicator variable equal to 1 if the allegation was made later after 2002, 0 otherwise; EM ϭ an indicator variable equal to 1 if the allegation is related to earnings management, 0 otherwise; and OVERBILLNG ϭ an indicator variable equal to 1 if the allegations related to overbilling, 0 otherwise. problems in the firm, then one would expect firms subject to such allegations to be more likely to file future earnings restatements, to be the target of shareholder lawsuits, and to suffer weak future operating and stock return performance.
We recognize the issue of endogeneity in evaluating the consequences of whistle-blowing events. In other words, when we assess future economic consequences such as operating or stock return performance, it is possible that whistle-blowing allegations arise from many of the same economic forces that contribute to subsequent problems after a whistle-blowing allegation. Hence, it would be inappropriate to treat the whistle-blowing event as exogenous, especially given that we attempt to model the factors associated with whistle-blowing in Section IV.
We control for the potential endogeneity between whistle-blowing allegations and future economic consequences by comparing whistle-blowing targets to a sample of control firms matched on the propensity to experience a whistle-blowing event ͑Armstrong et al. 2009; Francis and Lennox 2008͒. The primary benefit of using a control sample matched on propensity scores is that it allows us to compare whistle-blowing firms to a set of firms that are the same on all observable dimensions, thus allowing us to more clearly attribute any observed consequence to the whistle-blowing event itself, rather than to the firm characteristics associated with whistle-blowing allegations. From a practical standpoint, this matched sample also allows us to compare whistleblowing firms to control firms along a variety of dimensions ͑e.g., restatements, lawsuits, operating performance, stock return performance͒ without the need for additional control variables. In essence, our propensity-score matching procedure directly controls for any relevant difference between whistle-blowing and control firms.
To identify the propensity-score matched control sample, we estimate model ͑1͒ for the whistle-blowing firms and the broad control sample ͑as outlined in Panel A of Table 2͒ , and calculate a propensity score for each firm, which is the conditional probability of receiving the treatment effect ͑i.e., the probability that the firm experienced a whistle-blowing event͒ given all the observable data. 13 For each whistle-blowing target, we select two control firms with the closest propensity scores, and these firms constitute the propensity-score matched control sample. The result is that each whistle-blowing firm is matched to two firms that were not subject to whistleblowing allegations but are similar along all other relevant dimensions.
14 Since the matched control sample is similar along every observable dimension, any difference in outcome between whistle-blowing and control samples can be attributed to the whistle-blowing event.
We measure "covariate balance" to ensure that the whistle-blowing and matched control samples are similar across all dimensions except the variable of interest ͑i.e., being the target of whistle-blowing allegations͒. 15 In general, untabulated results suggest that in comparing whistleblowing firms to these control firms, we effectively control for the potential endogeneity linking whistle-blowing allegations and future consequences. However, we do find a significant difference in the distribution ͑but not the mean͒ of SIZE when comparing whistle-blowing and control samples. Therefore, to be conservative, we control for SIZE in subsequent tests. 13 In order to maximize the number of observations available for the propensity score matching procedure, we estimate model ͑1͒ excluding EXT_MONITOR and GOVERNANCE. 14 We choose two matched firms for each whistle-blowing target in an effort to maximize the number of firms in this control sample while ensuring that there is no statistical difference in the propensity scores between treatment and control firms. 15 We formally assess covariate balance by testing whether the means and medians of the covariates used in model ͑1͒ differ between the whistle-blowing and controls samples. The untabulated results suggest that the propensity-score matched samples resemble the whistle-blowing samples along virtually all dimensions. Specifically, there is no significant difference in means of any of the covariates between whistle-blowing and matched control firms ͑for either the Press or OSHA samples͒. Furthermore, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the null hypothesis of similar distributions for each of these variables, with the exception of SIZE.
Do Whistle-Blowing Announcements Lead to Subsequent Earnings Restatements? (Q3a)
To assess subsequent consequences ͑in this and the following lawsuit-based tests͒, we rely on the restatement and lawsuit samples discussed in Section III with one major exception. Unlike Section III, we do not eliminate whistle-blowing firms that experienced a restatement or lawsuit, as the purpose of this analysis is to document the existence of such a link should it exist. 16, 17 The results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that whistle-blowing firms in the Press sample experienced significantly more subsequent restatements ͑p ϭ 0.013͒ in the three years following a whistle-blowing action ͑17.9 percent͒ than propensity-score matched control firms ͑7.5 percent͒. Panel B of Table 4 reports that whistle-blowing firms in the OSHA sample also experienced more restatements ͑13.7 percent͒ than propensity-score matched control firms ͑9.5 percent͒, but the difference is not significant at conventional levels ͑p ϭ 0.141͒. However, when we look only at the subset of future restatements that represent accounting irregularities ͑as defined by Hennes et al. ͓2008͔͒, we find that OSHA firms were more likely to experience an accounting irregularity than their matched counterparts ͑p ϭ 0.053, untabulated͒.
Because the whistle-blowing and propensity-score matched control samples had different SIZE distributions, we also controlled for SIZE. These results, reported in Panel C of Table 4 , support our earlier conclusions. In sum, firms exposed to whistle-blowing events reported in the press were more likely to experience a subsequent restatement than were matched control firms with similar underlying characteristics.
Do Whistle-Blowing Announcements Lead to Subsequent Shareholder Lawsuits? (Q3b)
Table 5 provides evidence on whether whistle-blowing allegations were a precursor to shareholder lawsuits. The sample analyzed for this test again includes 67 Press firms and their 134 propensity-score matched control firms, and 95 OSHA firms along with their 190 matched control firms. The results in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that whistle-blowing firms in the Press sample experienced significantly more subsequent lawsuits ͑p ϭ 0.004͒ following a whistle-blowing action ͑26.9 percent͒ than propensity-score matched control firms ͑11.9 percent͒. Panel B of Table  5 reports that whistle-blowing firms in the OSHA sample also experienced more lawsuits ͑11.6 percent͒ than propensity-score matched control firms ͑8.4 percent͒, but the difference is not significant at conventional levels ͑p ϭ 0.196͒. Controlling for SIZE in Panel C yields similar conclusions. In summary, the evidence in Tables 4 and 5 suggests that a whistle-blowing event reported in the press can be an early warning indicator of future earnings restatements or shareholder lawsuits, and that whistle-blowing allegations are not trivial and/or baseless, on average.
Are Whistle-Blowing Events Associated with Relatively Poor Future Operating Performance? (Q3c)
In this and the following section, we evaluate whether whistle-blowing allegations serve as an early warning of negative future operating or stock price performance. The link between a whistleblowing event and negative future performance can be motivated in at least three ways. First, given our earlier evidence that whistle-blowing can be a significant indicator of subsequent earn- 16 We verified that the whistle-blowing announcement preceded the earnings restatement before the announcement entered the empirical analyses. However, note that the GAO report discloses the date of the restatement announcement, and not the years being restated. Data on the year being restated is generally patchy and unreliable. Hence, we did not pursue an investigation into the year for which the financial statements were restated. 17 The time-windows and data selection for the restatement tests need some elaboration. We assume that whistle-blowing events increase the probability of a restatement announcement within the next three years ͑including the year of the allegation͒. Because the GAO restatement data are available only from 1997 to 2005, we are forced to delete observations that occur in and before 1993. Thus, the sample analyzed for these tests includes 67 Press firms and their 134 propensity-score matched control firms, and 95 OSHA firms along with their 190 propensity-score matched control firms.
ings restatements and lawsuits, it is perhaps natural to expect negative future performance subsequent to a whistle-blowing event. Second, managers may engage in defensive actions to mitigate negative publicity and other consequences of a whistle-blowing event. Such defensive efforts can distract managers from normal profit-seeking activities and siphon funds away from strategic investments. Third, a whistle-blowing event can hurt the firm's image with its stakeholders, result in a loss of confidence in management, increase the probability of management turnover, and/or increase the perception that additional problems are lurking. *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
p-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions. We report ͑1 Ϫ p͒ values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted. a p-values are associated with the Pearson Chi-square test statistic, and test for differences in the proportion of firms that experience a restatement.
Variable Definitions ͑where firm subscripts are suppressed͒: RESTATE t+3 ϭ 1 if the firm experienced a restatement in the event year or in the three subsequent years, 0 otherwise; WB t ϭ 1 if the firm experienced a whistle-blowing event, 0 otherwise; and SIZE t−1 ϭ total sales revenue ͑Compustat annual #12͒ for the year before the whistle-blowing event.
In analyzing the link between whistle-blowing events and future operating performance, we calculate cumulative return on assets ͑ROA͒ for three time windows following the whistle-blowing event ranging from one to three years ͑i.e., ROA for year ϩ1; years ϩ1 and ϩ2; and years ϩ1, ϩ2, and ϩ3͒. The data in Panels A and B of Table 6 indicate that both Press and OSHA firms report lower ROA in the year immediately following the whistle-blowing allegation. Beyond the first year, whistle-blowing firms did not report statistically lower ROA. In Panels C and D, we control for SIZE, finding similar results, except that Press firms also reported lower ROA in the two years after the whistle-blowing event. *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
p-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions. We report ͑1 Ϫ p͒ values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted. a p-values are associated with the Pearson Chi-square test statistic, and test for differences in the proportion of firms that experience a lawsuit.
Variable Definitions ͑where firm subscripts are suppressed͒: LAWSUIT t+3 ϭ 1 if the firm experienced a lawsuit in the event year or in the three subsequent years, 0 otherwise; WB t ϭ 1 if the firm experienced a whistle-blowing event, 0 otherwise; and SIZE t−1 ϭ total sales revenue ͑Compustat annual #12͒ for the year before the whistle-blowing event. Table 7 presents data on future stock return performance of firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations. In particular, we consider monthly returns over three years following the month in which the whistle-blowing allegation becomes public. Thus, this event window does not overlap with our immediate consequences tests reported earlier in Section V. Panel A of Table 7 reveals Press firms reported lower abnormal returns over the one, two, and three years following the whistle-blowing event. Panel B reports some evidence consistent with OSHA firms also reporting lower returns over the subsequent two or three years.
In Panels C and D of Table 7 , we regress raw monthly returns RET on ͑1͒ SIZE because whistle-blowing firms and the propensity-score matched control firms did not exhibit the same distribution along this one dimension, and ͑2͒ the other three Fama-French factors, including momentum. We include a WB indicator equal to 1 for firms in the whistle-blowing sample, and 0 otherwise, which allows for a different intercept for whistle-blowing firms and control firms. The regressions are conducted using the firm-month as the unit of analysis. The variable of interest in these analyses is WB. If whistle-blowing allegations were associated with poor future stock return performance, then we ought to observe a negative coefficient on WB, after controlling for other factors influencing stock returns. The results reported in Panels C and D of Table 7 are generally consistent with the univariate results. Press firms exhibited lower returns in year ϩ1 and year ϩ2, while OSHA firms exhibited lower returns in year ϩ2 and year ϩ3. In general, we find that firms targeted by whistle-blowers suffered lower returns in subsequent years, which in turn suggests that whistle-blowing allegations were not frivolous and without merit, on average.
VI. DO WHISTLE-BLOWING TARGETS RESPOND BY CHANGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE? (Q4)
In this section, we investigate our fourth research question ͑Q4͒: What actions ͑if any͒ do whistle-blowing targets take to improve corporate governance following the revelation of a whistle-blowing allegation? It is not clear whether firms will take meaningful actions to improve corporate governance following a whistle-blowing event. For example, a targeted firm can easily initiate cosmetic changes such as replacing one set of inside directors with another set of insiders. In extreme cases, a target firm might even fire the whistle-blower. *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Coefficients ͑t-statistics͒ are reported. p-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions. We report ͑1 Ϫ p͒ values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted. a p-values are associated with t-statistics. b p-values are associated with Wilcoxon z-statistics.
Variable Definitions ͑where firm subscripts are suppressed͒:
ROA t+n ϭ buy-and-hold return on assets, starting with ROA in the year after the event date, and ending n years after the whistle-blowing event; WB t ϭ 1 if the firm experienced a whistle-blowing event, 0 otherwise; and SIZE t−1 ϭ total sales revenue ͑Compustat annual #12͒ for the year before the whistle-blowing event. *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
(continued on next page)
Changes in Governance Variables
We hand-collect governance data for the Press and OSHA whistle-blowing samples from their 10-Ks and proxy statements. 18 To limit data collection to manageable levels, we focus on six aspects of governance, details of which have been discussed earlier in Section II: ͑1͒ the number of directors on the board ͑DIRECTORS͒; ͑2͒ the proportion of insiders on the board ͑%INS_DIR͒; ͑3͒ the proportion of the board composed of busy directors where busy is defined as three additional directorships ͑%BUSY͒; ͑4͒ the percentage attendance at board meetings ͑%ATTEND͒; ͑5͒ the proportion of firms where the CEO is also the chairman of the board ͑CEOϭCOB%͒, and ͑6͒ the proportion of firms with a new CEO ͑NEW_CEO%͒. We calculate three-year changes in these six governance variables from the year before the whistle-blowing event ͑year Ϫ1͒ to two years after the event occurs ͑year ϩ2͒. Of the 81 ͑137͒ possible Press ͑OSHA͒ firms, we are unable to find 10-Ks and/or proxy statements for 24 ͑47͒ firms.
Since governance improvements were encouraged in the period following the accounting scandals and SOX, we also collect governance data for a sample of matched firms that were not subject to a whistle-blowing allegation. We select matched firms with the same four-digit SIC code, within the same stock exchange, and with net sales as close as possible to the whistleblowing firm's net sales for the year before the whistle-blowing event.
19,20 Table 8 reports the multivariate analyses that compare each governance change between the Press sample and their matched-firms counterparts. Control variables include: size ͑SALES͒, past stock market performance ͑RET͒, and the change in firm size over the corresponding three-year period ͑∆SIZE͒ to control for the possibility that changes in governance ͑e.g., smaller board size͒ were simply driven by changes in firm size. We find that, compared to the matched control sample, firms exposed to whistle-blowing allegations via the press were more likely to reduce the size of the board, reduce insider participation on the board, have less busy board members, and were more likely to replace the CEO.
In untabulated findings, we find no evidence that OSHA firms made changes in governance. Thus, on average, whistle-blowing targets exposed via the press appeared to change governance on four dimensions that exceeded the level of market-wide governance improvements occurring in the post-SOX era, while firms targeted by whistle-blowers via OSHA ͑a less public venue͒ did not. This suggests the visibility of the allegation played a role in firms' responses to whistle-blowing allegations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Whistle-blowing has received considerable attention in recent years after ͑1͒ whistle-blowers were responsible, in part, for revealing the accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom, and ͑2͒ provisions in SOX were enacted to protect employee whistle-blowers. Still, little is known about the nature of firms that are subject to whistle-blowing and whether such allegations are economically significant events with meaningful consequences for the targeted firms. Unlike other research 18 Note that we hand-collect proxy data to assess subsequent governance changes, rather than use the IRRC data used in Section II, in order to maximize the number of useable observations in this analysis. 19 If we cannot find a match firm within the same four-digit SIC code, then we relax the matching criteria to include firms with the same three-digit SIC code, and if necessary, the same two-digit SIC code. 20 We employ a matched control sample in this analysis to ensure that any observed governance changes are not the result of market-wide improvements in governance ͑rather than improvements specific to whistle-blowing targets͒. Our matching criteria are consistent with this concern. We do not match on propensity scores ͑as with our consequences analyses͒ because propensity matches are not necessarily aligned in calendar time, and because we want to examine whether whistle-blowing targets improved governance relative to a broad cross-section of firms. We acknowledge that comparing whistle-blowing firms to the average firm results in a somewhat lower benchmark than would comparing them to a propensity-score matched sample. However, we feel this is appropriate because our sample period already represents a period of improved governance, such that the average firm was likely making governance improvements.
to date, our focus is on ͑1͒ characteristics of firms targeted by employee whistle-blowers, ͑2͒ the economic consequences of such whistle-blowing revelations, and ͑3͒ firm responses to such allegations via subsequent governance changes. Specifically, we report new empirical evidence on 218 employee whistle-blowing events between 1989 and 2004. Our paper adds to the literature on corporate governance in four ways. First, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis of the characteristics of firms subject to whistle- *, **, *** Significant at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
p-values are reported in parentheses. p-values are one-sided for variables with directional predictions. We report ͑1 Ϫ p͒ values for coefficients that assume a sign opposite to the one predicted. a We compare the value of each governance variable in year Ϫ1 ͑pre-allegation͒ to its value in year ϩ2 ͑post-allegation͒. b We report the results of an ordinal logistic regression, including the pseudo-R 2 . c We report the results of a logistic regression, including the pseudo-R 2 .
Definition of variables ͑where firm subscripts are suppressed͒: ⌬DIRECTORS t+2 ϭ number of directors in year ϩ2 minus the number of directors in year Ϫ1; ⌬%INS_DIR t+2 ϭ percent of inside directors in year ϩ2 minus the percent of inside directors in year Ϫ1; ⌬%BUSY t+2 ϭ percent of "busy" directors in year ϩ2 minus the percent of busy directors in year Ϫ1; ⌬%ATTEND t+2 ϭ percent board meeting attendance in year ϩ2 minus the percent board meeting attendance in year Ϫ1; ⌬CEO = COB% t+2 ϭ an ordinal variable coded as 1 if the CEO was not the COB in year ϩ2 but was in year Ϫ1, coded as Ϫ1 if the CEO was the COB in year ϩ2 but was not in year Ϫ1, and coded as 0 otherwise; ⌬NEW_CEO% t+2 ϭ an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm replaced its CEO in year 0, year ϩ1, or year ϩ2, and 0 otherwise; WB t ϭ 1 if the firm experienced a whistle-blowing event, 0 otherwise; REV t−1 ϭ total sales revenue ͑Compustat annual #12͒ for the year before the whistle-blowing event; RET t−1 ϭ market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns for 12 months, beginning with month Ϫ12 and ending with month Ϫ1, where month 0 is the event month; and ⌬SIZE t+2 ϭ total assets in year ϩ2 minus total assets in year Ϫ1.
blowing. Our evidence is broadly consistent with whistle-blowers targeting firms that were large, growing, successful, and highly regarded. Whistle-blowing tended to be more prevalent in firms that had downsized and in firms with worse governance. Finally, and not surprisingly, when the potential benefits to the whistle-blower increased ͑via the potential to share in any fraud-related settlement͒, employees were more likely to make public allegations of wrongdoing.
Second, we present evidence that, on average, whistle-blowing allegations had an immediate negative economic consequence for target firms. The average market-adjusted return in the five days around the day the allegation became public was Ϫ2.8 percent. Further, the stock market reaction was substantially more negative when the whistle-blower alleged earnings management ͑Ϫ7.3 percent͒.
Third, we find that whistle-blowing targets had more earnings restatements ͑Press sample͒, more shareholder lawsuits ͑Press sample͒, and relatively poor operating and stock return performance ͑press and OSHA samples͒ compared to a sample of propensity-score matched firms with similar characteristics. Whistle-blower allegations appear to be an early indicator of future negative economic consequences for targeted firms.
Fourth, we find that, on average, whistle-blowing targets exposed in the press improved several dimensions of governance relative to the year before the whistle-blowing event and relative to a matched sample of control firms. Interestingly, these governance improvements were not apparent for firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations that were not widely disseminated ͑OSHA sample͒. In sum, whistle-blowing is far from a trivial nuisance for firms targeted by allegations of corporate misconduct.
Our research represents early work on the role of financial whistle-blowing and provides indirect evidence on the effectiveness of Sarbanes-Oxley ͑SOX͒ Section 806 as a mechanism to expose agency problems at firms. We find that public whistle-blowing events are relatively infrequent, and a majority of the whistle-blowing allegations we identify are not directly related to the types of fraudulent behavior that precipitated the SOX legislation. Future research could examine ͑1͒ the impact of the whistle-blowing provisions in SOX on the incidence and types of whistleblowing allegations and ͑2͒ whether investors, regulators, and other stakeholders benefit from ͑or overreact to͒ whistle-blowing allegations. Additionally, future research could examine how OSHA is performing in its role of adjudicating SOX-related whistle-blowing complaints. Finally, if one could obtain the data, an examination of the frequency, importance, and consequences of internal whistle-blowing would be a valuable contribution to the literature.
APPENDIX VARIABLE DEFINITIONS Capital Market Pressure
FIN_NEED ϭ an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm's free cash flow in the year prior to the whistle-blowing event is less than Ϫ0.1, and 0 otherwise. Similar to Dechow et al. ͑1996͒, we calculate free cash flow as cash flow less the average capital expenditure ͑Compustat annual #128͒ over the last three years, deflated by average total assets. M&A ϭ an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm was involved in a merger or acquisition ͑Compustat AFTN #1͒ in year t or in any one of the three years prior to the whistle-blowing event, and 0 otherwise. ABSDACC ϭ the absolute value of discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones ͑1991͒ model for the fiscal year before the whistle-blowing event. 
Employee Downsizing
DOWNSIZEϭ the scaled rank of employee growth, defined as the average growth in the total employees ͑Compustat annual #29͒ over the three years prior to the whistle-blowing event.
Qui Tam
QUITAM ϭ an indicator variable coded as 1 if the firm ͑1͒ is in the healthcare industry ͑2-digit SIC code ϭ 80͒, or ͑2͒ appeared on the "100 Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Volume of Prime Contract Awards" list in any of the three years prior to the whistle-blowing event, and 0 otherwise.
Firm Size
SIZE ϭ the scaled rank of total sales revenue ͑Compustat annual #12͒ for the year before the whistle-blowing event.
Internal Control Weaknesses
ICW ϭ the scaled rank of the fitted value from the following model, as estimated by Doyle et al. ͑2007͒: ICW = ␤ 2 + ␤ 2 MARKETCAP + ␤ 2 FIRM_AGE + ␤ 2 LOSSES + ␤ 2 SEGMENTS + ␤ 2 FOREIGN_TRANS + ␤ 2 EXTREME_SG + ␤ 2 RESTRUCTURE + error, where MARKETCAP ϭ the log of the firm's market capitalization, FIRM_AGE ϭ the log of the number of years the firm has CRSP data, LOSSES ϭ an indicator variable equal to 1 if earnings before extraordinary items in the two most recent years sum to less than zero, and 0 otherwise, SEGMENTS ϭ the log of the number of operating and geographic segments reported by the Compustat Segments database, FOREIGN_TRANS ϭ an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has nonzero foreign translation, and 0 otherwise, EXTREME_SG ϭ an indicator variable equal to 1 if year-over-year industry-adjusted sales growth falls into the top quintile, and 0 otherwise, and RESTRUCTURE ϭ the aggregate restructuring charge in the two most recent years, scaled by the firm's market capitalization. ICW is measured as of the year immediately before the whistle-blowing event. We use coefficient values as reported in Doyle et al. ͑2007͒ . Because of limited data availability, we set SEGMENTS equal to 0 if the necessary data is not available.
